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HATE THE PLAYER AND HATE THE GAME:  
THE POLITICS OF THE WAR AGAINST THE YOUNG1 
 
 
 
 
The Game 
 Without question, our young people have paid a heavy price in the so-called War Against 
Crime. The most vulnerable political targets of the demagogues on crime policy were adolescents 
(Krisberg, 2005). The next most vulnerable political targets were women who were incarcerated in 
unprecedented numbers due to mandatory drug laws. The young children of these incarcerated 
moms were the civilian collateral damage of the Drug War, receiving less than benign attention by 
state criminal justice and welfare officials (Krisberg & Temin, 2000). To the extent that obscene 
levels of spending on the War on Crime have led to reduced funding for education, health care, 
after school programs, and job training, low income youngsters have paid an indirect and 
egregious tax to finance the attack on them by cynical politicians. 
 The War against the Young has taken many forms. The most significant assaults on 
children in California were new legislative and voter initiatives (Proposition 21) that were 
designed to try children as young as 14-years-old in criminal courts. Other states created even 
lower age limits for youths to be tried as adults. For example Michigan prosecuted children who 
were as young as 9-years-old. Related to this trend of Acracking down@ on juvenile crime, many 
localities adopted aggressive anti-gang campaigns, including automated police intelligence files 
                                                 
 1 The title of this paper takes poetic license with the Hip Hop phase, A Don=t hate the player, hate the game.@ 
This saying is often used to excuse the behavior of people involved in exploitive and dishonest actions as part of the 
Asurvival of the fittest.@ The phrase suggests a sense of pride in the abilities of some streetwise individuals to employ 
their wit and resiliency to overcome harsh social conditions that are often out of their control. By altering this phrase, I 
mean to say that the powerful and influential officials who push for destructive legal and social policies need to be 
held publicly accountable for their personal choices. These establishment players do have the ability to change the 
circumstances in which they operate. 
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 that contained the names of tens of thousands of adolescents who were merely suspected of having 
some gang affiliation. Not even minimal standards of Aprobable cause@ were required to place 
names in these files, and there were no clear methods through which a young person could remove 
his or her name from the gang intelligence systems. These law enforcement files were not covered 
by the usual confidentiality protections that normally apply to juvenile court proceedings. Further, 
vague evidence that a young person was Agang affiliated@ could be used in criminal sentencing to 
greatly enhance penalties. A recently released documentary entitled JUVIES presents the tragic 
story of twelve young people aged 14-16 who were all sentenced to very long prison sentences. In 
several of the cases, the impact of gang enhancements produced enormous increases in the 
sentences. For example, the film profiles a 16-year-old Vietnamese boy with no prior arrests who 
is now serving a prison term of 35 years to life. He was driving a car when one of the passengers 
fired a gun. No one was hit by the bullet, and there were no injuries. Still, the young driver was 
convicted of attempted murder with gang enhancements that will keep him in prison for many 
decades. There was very little hard evidence that the young man was involved with any gangs. 
 The hysteria over juvenile gangs, partially fueled by the media, led to a virtual cottage 
industry of Agang experts@ who allegedly could decipher graffiti for gang messages. With little 
objective evidence, some members the law enforcement community created fantastic mythologies 
about how Los Angeles street gangs were spreading their ominous colors of red and blue across 
the country, and even around the world. Long before the September 11th bombings of the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Patriot Act, and the Department of Homeland Security, the 
United States was gearing up for a life or death struggle against juvenile gangs. Ironically, juvenile 
crime was dropping during most of this period, and the violent presence of youth gangs were more 
prevalent on television or the cinema than in urban neighborhoods.  
 During this period, police agencies launched high profile Amade-for-television@ crackdowns 
on gangs. The Los Angeles Police Department organized massive weekend offensives (known as 
  4
AOperation Hammer@) in South Central Los Angeles that resulted in thousands of arrests. So many 
young people were taken into custody that the LAPD set up a temporary booking operation at the 
University of Southern California football stadium. These mass arrests were usually for minor 
crimes; the arrests resulted in few convictions and virtually no referrals to the California Youth 
Authority (Krisberg, 2005). 
 Fear of violent juvenile gang members persuaded California juvenile justice officials to 
send many more youths convicted of crimes to its juvenile prison system without even the pretense 
of considering alternatives to incarceration. In 1997, that system was almost at 200 percent of its 
housing capacity. It was at this time that the Youth Authority=s traditional emphasis on treatment 
and education was eroded, with increased use of custodial staff who dressed and comported 
themselves more like prison guards than counselors. Youth Authority employees were being 
organized by the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), which also 
represents the prison guards. This movement away from the rehabilitative model was illustrated by 
the practice of having some Youth Authority residents receive their educational programs in cages. 
These were steel mesh devices that were the size of a telephone booth. The teacher would pass the 
student his or her textbooks or lessons through a small slot in the cage. The Youth Authority also 
instituted the use of attack dogs in some of its facilities to prevent escapes and quell riots. Juvenile 
correctional facilities continued to utilize the attack dogs long after the Department of Corrections 
decided to abandon this practice. Funding for rehabilitation, mental health, and medical care in 
state juvenile facilities was severely cut back. In the mid-1990s, the Director of the Youth 
Authority adopted the rhetoric of the prison guards union and claimed that his facilities were 
among the Atoughest beats in the state.@ 
 At the local level, correctional boot camps and the ideology of Atough love@ dominated 
community conversations about youth crime. Schools jumped into the War Against the Young by 
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 creating mandatory suspension and expulsion policies such as AZero Tolerance@ programs that 
claimed to be making schools safer. Many urban schools required that youths pass through metal 
detectors to enter school buildings. Some public school districts debated requiring students to wear 
uniforms to classes so as to discourage Agang clothing.@ Students were pressured to submit to 
mandatory drug testing if they wished to participate in extra-curricular programs and sports teams. 
More police than ever before were assigned to work on high school and junior high school 
campuses; other school districts hired their own private security officers. Unannounced searches of 
student desks and lockers became much more common. Students who allegedly were wearing gang 
colors were summarily kicked out of school. 
 There are only partial data on how many young people fell victim to pernicious Zero 
Tolerance policies. The California Department of Education website reported that there were 
almost 25,000 students recommended for expulsion in fiscal year 2002-03. Of those students, 
approximately 83 percent were actually expelled (California Department of Education, 2004). In 
recent years the numbers of California pupils expelled from school has increased steadily. While 
there were some limited legal challenges to these new rules, the general picture was of informal 
and arbitrary enforcement practices that were not guided by due process or equal protection of law. 
By all accounts, students of color were the most likely targets by these Zero Tolerance policies. 
Data from the Oakland Unified School District for 2003-2004 showed that white students 
accounted for just 6 percent of the 4,297 students who were suspended that year. African 
American students made up 71 percent of those suspended. The very limited data on the reasons 
for school suspensions and expulsions suggest that most of these severe actions were not taken 
against students who brought weapons to school or engaged in violence. For example, in the 
Berkeley Unified School District the overwhelming majority of suspensions and expulsions were 
for Adefying authority,@ .i.e., talking back or arguing with teachers and other school staff (Berkeley 
Unified School District, 2002). 
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 Another crucial aspect of the War Against the Young was the movement to re-criminalize 
juvenile status offenses. These are offenses such as truancy, curfew violations, running away, and 
Aincorrigibility@ that are only law violations if committed by minors. In the 1970s there was a 
national reform movement to divert these youths from secure detention centers, keep them out of 
the formal juvenile court system, and expand the use of community-based organizations to deal 
with these family issues. California enacted legislation in 1978 (AB 3121) to remove status 
offenders from locked facilities and the formal justice system. Young women historically had been 
the primary targets of the status offense laws. Whereas young men were about as likely as girls to 
be arrested for juvenile status offenses, it was young women who were incarcerated for these 
behaviors. The perverse and prejudicial logic behind these policies was that girls needed to be 
protected from themselves, especially their nascent sexuality. The new law limiting the application 
of juvenile status offense laws significantly reduced the number of girls in state and county 
juvenile correctional institutions. 
 There was a rediscovery of the alleged value of strict enforcement of laws against truancy, 
the need to reestablish curfews for juveniles, and increased incarceration for runaways. Many 
communities passed new local ordinances to restrict the behavior of young people. Courts and 
probation agencies used the pretext of violations of probation or violations of court orders to 
charge youths with offenses that could result in their incarceration. Thus, youths who were brought 
into Court were ordered to attend school regularly, to be at home before a specific time, or to 
cooperate with their guardians. Young people who allegedly failed to meet these rules could be 
sentenced for more serious charges. In a practice known as Aboot strapping,@ youths who got into 
aggressive arguments with their parents or guardians could be charged with domestic violence. 
Children who were placed in foster care or group homes could be labeled as delinquents if they left 
these placements without official permission. Law enforcement and school officials asserted that 
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 threatening young people and their parents with criminal prosecutions would reduce truancy rates. 
All of these severe restrictions on young people were loudly justified as measures required for 
increased child protection.  
 The campaign to arrest and incarcerate young people for status offenses was sold to the 
public based on heightened fears about child abductions and sexual exploitation of young children. 
In California and across the nation, there were well-financed media campaigns focusing on 
missing and exploited children. The federal government pumped millions of dollars into publicity 
about missing children through the National Center on Missing and Exploited Children. Despite 
these millions of taxpayer funds, there is no documented case in which the Center actually found a 
missing child. 
 Parents were frightened to death about the potential kidnapping of their children by 
strangers. Faces of children showed up on milk cartoons. Other commercial enterprises sold 
identification and fingerprinting equipment to petrified parents. Schools and nonprofit groups 
started training programs to teach young children to avoid abduction. Despite these scare 
campaigns, the evidence grew that most of the missing and exploited children had either been 
taken by their non-custodial parents, usually in the context of bitter divorce proceedings, or they 
were teenagers that had run away from home. Some research suggested that many of these 
runaways were actually escaping from abusive living situations. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation estimated that there were fewer than 200 abductions by strangers a year in the entire 
nation. Of course there were a very small number of child kidnappings and murders such as the 
Adam Walsh and Polly Klaas tragedies that galvanized worldwide media attention and further 
fueled the hysteria about missing children. Motorists were often greeted with highway signs and 
broadcast AAmber Alerts@ telling us about the most current missing child. Many of these alerts 
proved inaccurate and created false impressions about the frequency of child abductions. 
 Young people are virtual sitting ducks for politicians and other public officials who want to 
  8
push Aget tough@ crime policies. The immediate costs to cynical elected officials of fighting the 
War Against the Young appear to be minimal. Adolescents cannot or do not vote. Young people 
do not sit on the boards of directors of corporations, foundations, universities, religious 
organizations, or large nonprofit organizations. Few unions regard young people as their 
constituents, rather adolescents are often viewed as economic threats to older unionized workers. 
Youths were not invited to be active participants in the political discussions and decision-making 
forums that led to the War Against the Young. In the mainstream political process, youth are often 
used as Awindow dressing@ and as a means to create campaign photo opportunities. 
 A school-based curriculum on civic engagement of the young is sorely lacking. Education 
in the politics of social justice is almost non-existent in most public educational settings. Young 
people do not belong to well-heeled political lobby groups such as the American Association of 
Retired People, the National Rifle Association, or the Chamber of Commerce. The conventional 
media rarely seeks out a youth perspective on critical public policy questions. The viewpoints of 
adolescents are generally not measured by influential public polling organizations. The 
organizations that seek to be advocates for young people are chronically underfunded, 
understaffed, and largely ignored by the political establishment. 
 Adolescents in this society are a lucrative market for a broad range of commodities 
including tobacco, alcoholic beverages, fast food and snacks, trendy clothing, grooming aids, 
expensive electronic toys, music, and movies, to name a few products. Genuine aspects of youth 
culture are often co-opted by the media which sells these images to young and old alike. For 
instance, the mass media embraced a powerful portrayal of violent, sexually promiscuous, 
drugged, urban minority youths that is retailed to suburban and rural youngsters so that they can 
spend their disposable income to cultivate the AGangsta@ look at the carefully protected and 
sanitized suburban shopping malls. These harsh racist stereotypes promoted by the media are, in 
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 turn, used by adults to justify the need to increase social controls on the young. 
 The great American criminologist Marvin Wolfgang observed that fear of the young by 
adults is as old as human history. He wrote about a Sumerian tablet that revealed deep-seated fear 
that young people were the Abarbarians at the gates@ that would bring down the social order. 
Whether it was the sexually explicit young people of the Jazz Age of the 1920s, the Rock and Roll 
rebels of the 1950s, the culturally subversive Hippies of the 1960s, or the Hip Hop Generation of 
the 1990s, adolescents have almost always signaled that the social norms could be changed, 
sometimes in ways frightening for adults. These concerns may be on the rise as the baby boom 
generation is aging and facing retirement, and senior citizens become the largest voting block in 
the Nation. These fears intensify as young people of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds make 
legitimate claims to be seen and heard. The perception that the young are wildly out of control and 
need tighter regulation is a longstanding and powerful cultural theme easily exploited by 
politicians, some religious leaders, and the media. 
 
The Players 
 While we can comprehend The Game in sociological terms and focus on the structural 
forces that led to bad social policies for the young, it is equally important to expose the perfidy of 
those power hungry politicians, government bureaucrats, and academic mountebanks that have 
fueled the War Against the Young. I would like to present a brief review of three dramatic 
California instances in which powerful and influential adults betrayed our young people. Besides 
talking about the main villains in the piece, I will discuss the smaller roles that others played in 
these examples of bad public policy. 
 
AB 136 and the Rise and Fall of Chuck Quackenbush  
 For more than a half century, California law mandated that persons under age 16 were to be 
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tried in juvenile courts regardless of the gravity of their crimes. While there were very limited 
examples of persons between the ages of 16 and 18 being tried as adults, the vast majority of 
minors were handled in the juvenile justice system and served their sentences in the California 
Youth Authority, the mission of which was to pursue the goals of treatment and rehabilitation, not 
punishment. Before 1994, the maximum sentence that could be given to a youthful murderer under 
the age of 16 was to be confined in the Youth Authority until age 25. Other states began amending 
their laws to permit serious juvenile offenders to be tried as adults and placed in prisons. For 
example, New York State revised its sentencing laws in 1978 to allow young offenders above the 
age of 14 to be handled in the adult criminal justice system. Throughout the country in the 1980s, 
states debated and passed new laws that sent more youths to the adult system. California was 
virtually alone among the large urbanized states to resist this urge to stiffen penalties for very 
young juvenile murderers. 
 All this changed as a politically ambitious Republican Legislator Chuck Quackenbush 
launched a media-focused set of hearings to support his bill, AB 136. The proposed legislation 
dropped the age at which children could be tried for murder in criminal courts, and could face a 
potential sentence in prison of Life Without the Possibility of Parole. Quakenbush used a time-
tested method to push his agendaCorganize events at which the surviving relatives of murder 
victims talked about the tragic loss of their family members and publicly shared their unremitting 
sorrow.  
 The media, especially the local television evening news, has come to adore these stories. 
Cynical news directors often say, Aif it bleeds it leads,@ and the focus on the suffering of ordinary 
citizens is compelling television. Not only is the viewer drawn to the drama of the tragic 
testimony, but there is an emotional Arush@ to viewers as they realize that the story is about 
someone else and not them. This is not unlike the emotional charge that is offered by horror 
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 movies or suspenseful television dramasCwe get a chance to vicariously experience the pain or 
fear of others without paying the price. Some years ago, Danish sociologist Svend Ranulf (1938) 
pointed out that this sort of very emotional news coverage is often used by totalitarian regimes to 
build support for repressive government actions. Most important, this sort of journalism generally 
does not address questions about why these terrible events occur, nor what the citizenry might do 
to make their families safer. Violence is portrayed as the random and irrational acts of strangers, 
despite the fact that most violence occurs among people who are well acquainted with each other. 
 Quakenbush used AB 136 to strengthen his image as a crime fighting conservative. He 
broadened his political rhetoric about AB 136 to encompass other conservative social concerns 
such as the alleged decline in personal responsibility and the claimed corrosive nature of the 
welfare system. As he noted, AOnce you bring government into the family, you really are zapping 
the energy of society. People think, >Why should I bust my tail to raise a family? Government will 
take care of all of that for us.= @ (Hubner & Wolfson, 1996: 259). Chuck Quackenbush=s argument 
for AB 136 also suggested, without providing any evidence, that the juvenile justice system was 
incapable of handling the Anew breed@ of young murderers. Pushing all the fear buttons, 
Quackenbush warned that AThe Little Monsters we have today who murder in cold blood are very 
dangerous individuals. They have to be punished and walled off from society for a very long 
period of time, if not forever.@ (Hubner & Wolfson, 1996: 260). He asked if voters were willing to 
bet their lives or those of their family members on the ability to rehabilitate young killers. He went 
on to explain AThe way you turn things around is to make crime hurt. If you hurt a person in this 
society, then society has to hurt you back. It=s very primitive, but people understand it@ (Hubner & 
Wolfson, 1996: 261). 
 These arguments certainly resonated with a strain of American social values that suggest 
that Aan eye for an eye@ or social revenge is an appropriate and effective response to crime. 
Further, there were several academic Aplayers@ such as James Q. Wilson, Charles Murray, and 
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John DiIulio who were providing seemingly valid intellectual cover for these political arguments. 
These professor-crime warriors told us that America was about to be overrun by a generation of 
Asuper predators@ who were psychologically damaged and possessed lower than average 
intelligence and would only respond to blunt social reactions to their criminal behavior (Wilson & 
Hernnstein, 1985; Murray & Cox, 1979; DiIulio, 1995). Employing language designed to scare 
white, middle-class voters, John DiIulio wrote about a coming ACrime Bomb@ carried by the new 
generation of A fatherless, Godless, and jobless A juvenile super predators that would be flooding 
America=s streets (DiIulio, 1995).  
 The highly questionable science produced by these conservative academics was trumpeted 
by right wing Athink tanks@ and given enormous coverage in the press. They were invited to 
present their flawed research to legislators, to the United States Congress, and to other gatherings 
of elected officials. 
 More moderate members of the California legislature could not resist the pressures from 
the fear-mongering right wing, the strong, publicity-savvy, victim=s advocacy groups, and the 
hysterical media. AB 136 was quickly passed and signed into law in 1994. This was the same year 
that Californians were discussing the AThree Strikes and You=re Out@ ballot proposition for 
habitual and violent adult offenders. Trepidation about violent crime was on the political and 
media front burners, with the rhetoric flame turned up high.  
 AB 136 affected a relatively small number of young defendants, but the break with past 
juvenile justice traditions emphasizing the possibility of rehabilitation for very young criminals 
signaled the start of a stampede among elected officials to demonstrate who could be tougher on 
juvenile criminals. A few years later, this trend resulted in another politically motivated campaign 
to pass Proposition 21, which amended juvenile law to move the State towards becoming the 
harshest juvenile sentencing system in the nation. 
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  And what of the payoffs for the major player behind AB 136, Chuck Quackenbush? The 
formerly obscure Santa Clara County lawmaker used the publicity gained via his support of AB 
136 to spearhead a statewide campaign to become elected as California=s Insurance Commissioner. 
Virtually all of Quackenbush=s well-funded television advertisements centered on his role to 
toughen laws against juvenile criminals. This might be an appropriate electoral theme if one was 
running for Governor or Attorney General, but crime control was not part of the job description of 
the Insurance Commissioner. Despite this logical disconnect, Quakenbush became California=s 
elected Insurance Commissioner. Politic pundits declared that the former Notre Dame University 
graduate was a rising political star who might be destined for even higher statewide or even 
national elective office. 
 Then something happened to derail the Quackenbush political bandwagon. A very high 
profile series in the Los Angeles Times written by top investigative journalist Virginia Ellis (2000) 
presented an alarming set of facts. It turned out that Commissioner Quackenbush had made several 
secret deals with major insurance companies that allowed them to escape fines for mishandling up 
to thousands of claims resulting from the terrible Northridge earthquake. Quackenbush ignored the 
advice of his own legal staff that might have produced hundreds of millions in fines for the 
offending insurance companies. Further, the investigation revealed that Quackenbush and his aides 
had Astrong-armed@ some of these same corporations to donate more than $12 million to nonprofit 
foundations that he created. Ms. Ellis uncovered confidential documents showing that the 
Quakenbush used his powers as Insurance Commissioner to create a Apolitical slush fund directed 
by highly paid consultants, to further his quest for higher public office.@ Pressures to have 
Quakenbush resign his office grew rapidly, but even in his last days in office, the erstwhile crime 
fighter approved contracts that obliged taxpayers to pay more than $1 million for his legal fees and 
those of his top staff for the investigations of wrongdoing.  
  Commissioner Quakenbush received no jail time for these alleged felonies. He resigned 
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his office and was able to move to Hawai`i to avoid further legal entanglements. It does not appear 
that he was made to Ahurt@ for the damage that he inflicted while in public office. Tragically, while 
Quackenbush is now a long forgotten Atrivia question@ in California politics, the harm to young 
people created by AB 136 continues. 
 
Governor Pete Wilson and Proposition 21 
 Many liberal legislators argued that the passage of AB 136 would calm the panic over 
juvenile violence, and would really only harm a very small number of youths. In 1994, 234 young 
people between the ages of 14 and 16 were arrested for homicide in the state of California 
(California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center, 1994). Opponents countered 
that AB 136 would just whet the appetite of ambitious politicians for more Araw meat@ juvenile 
justice law reform. Unfortunately, Californians did not have to wait very long to see who was 
correct about these future predictions. After the enactment of AB 136, virtually every legislative 
session contained additional bills that made it easier to try juveniles as adults by expanding the list 
of crimes that could result in adult prosecution. Other bills moved the burden of proof from 
prosecutors to defendants to show that young people should not be transferred to criminal courts. 
Yet even these further Acrackdown@ measures did not satisfy the players. 
 Recall that juvenile violent crime rates in California were sharply decreasing after 1993, 
but the media continued its focus on juvenile gangs and violent crimes by young people. In March 
of 2000, the voters were asked to approve a ballot measure entitled AThe Gang Violence and 
Juvenile Crime Prevention Act@ or as it became known more popularly, Proposition 21. This voter 
initiative rewrote over 50 pages of law covering the California juvenile justice system. It made it 
even easier to try young people in criminal courts for a long list of crimes. Under Proposition 21, 
the decision to try youths as adults could be made at the discretion of prosecutors, without any 
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 judicial review or hearing. Proposition 21 mandated secure confinement and stronger penalties for 
a wide range of juvenile offenders, including offenses such as vandalism of property costing over 
$50. The ballot measure expanded the definition of gang crimes to cover almost all offenses 
committed by three or more youths, and permitted large increases in penalties for alleged gang-
related crimes. Proposition 21 made clear that juvenile offenses would count under the existing 
draconian adult Three Strikes Law. Taken together, the provisions of Proposition 21 were viewed 
by both its critics and defenders alike as the toughest juvenile law in America. 
 Many of the provisions of Proposition 21 had been advocated for years by the California 
District Attorneys Association, but these ideas had gained little headway in the Legislature. Enter 
the major player, then-Governor Pete Wilson, who embraced Proposition 21 as a main component 
of his political agenda. It was broadly speculated in the political watering holes of Sacramento that 
former Governor Wilson wanted to make a run for the U.S. Presidency. The three big issues to 
establish the conservative bona fides for Wilson were his proposal to require labor unions to get 
annual permission from each member to use their dues for political purposes, an anti-teachers 
union program for school reform, and tough new laws against juvenile crime. It was alleged by 
some that Wilson=s staff had purposely delayed placing Proposition 21 on the ballot until the 
March 2000 California Primary Election to aid his national political ambitions (Shrag, 2000). 
Wilson=s spokespersons have denied this charge saying that they lacked the adequate funding to 
qualify the measure earlier. 
 Governor Wilson had perfected the art of using racially-charged wedge issues and ballot 
measures to solidify his conservative white voter base. Interestingly, some political observers felt 
that Pete Wilson was too moderate to capture the support of the very conservative California 
Republican party, let alone the very right wing national party apparatus. He had won two elections 
as Governor and was elected twice to the United States Senate pushing for tighter restrictions of 
undocumented workers (Propositions 187 and 227), denying them driver=s licenses as well as basic 
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health, welfare, and educational benefits that were available to other California residents. He 
fought to pass another voter initiative that made state Affirmative Action programs virtually illegal 
(Proposition 209). Wilson led the statewide campaign to pass Proposition 184, the Three Strikes 
Law. 
 Raising large amounts of funds from his corporate supporters, Wilson solicited and 
received major contributions for the Yes on Proposition 21 campaign from Pacific Gas and 
Electric, ARCO, Unocal 76 and the head of Hilton Hotels, who each paid $50,000. A spokesperson 
for Chevron admitted that his company gave $25,000 to the Proposition 21 campaign at the request 
of then-Governor Wilson. None of these businesses had any obvious corporate interest in 
supporting tougher juvenile sentencing laws, but they could scarcely turn down the request of the 
powerful Governor who was aiming for the White House (Ching, 2000). At least one advocate 
who opposed Proposition 21, Kimi Lee of the ACLU, stated that AThe corporations had no idea 
what they were supporting@ (Ching, 2000). Later, after Wilson=s Presidential prospects faded, 
many of the corporations that gave large donations to pass Proposition 21 withdrew their support 
of the measure. For example, when confronted by youthful protesters, PG&E publicly retracted its 
corporate endorsement of Proposition 21. 
 Wilson claimed that Proposition 21 was not connected to his political goals. He professed 
to just trying to be helpful to the California District Attorneys and Sheriffs who wanted the 
proposed Aget tough@ provisions of Proposition 21. It is worth noting that Mitch Zach, who was 
Pete Wilson=s top political director, was the primary strategist of the Proposition 21 campaign. 
As Wilson=s efforts to become the Republican Party nominee for President faded, so did his highly 
visible presence as the chief advocate for overhauling the juvenile justice system. After Wilson=s 
exit from the campaign, the prosecutors and sheriffs soldiered on to pass Proposition 21. They 
were assisted in their efforts by Governor Gray Davis who embraced Proposition 21 and 
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 sometimes confided to audiences that he thought that the Singapore juvenile justice system had 
got it rightCpresumably this meant that Governor Davis favored public caning as an acceptable 
juvenile correctional program. Davis had received over $2 million in campaign contributions from 
the prison guards union (CCPOA) during his run for Governor in 1998. Proposition 21 and other 
new laws that further swelled the inmate population and the budget of the Department of 
Corrections were good business investments for the CCPOA.2 
 Attorney General Bill Lockyer also played a significant role in the passage of Proposition 
21. Critics of the measure claimed that the very short and simple language that would appear on 
the ballot summary obscured the radical nature of law changes that would follow passage of the 
proposition. Unless one took the time to carefully review the full text of Proposition 21, most 
voters thought that they were being asked to endorse a measure to prevent juvenile violence and to 
fight dangerous street gangs. The ballot summary language emphasized the provisions about 
violent youth felons, but did not explain that Proposition 21 permitted police to wiretap groups of 
more than three juveniles whom they suspected of committing any crimes. Nor did the ballot 
summary language point to the elimination of much of the confidentiality of juvenile court 
hearings, or the stiff new penalties for juveniles committing property damage valued as low as 
$50. Appeals to Attorney General Lockyer to use the ballot summary to describe the wide ranging 
nature of the changes in California law fell on deaf ears. Polls suggested that the more voters knew 
                                                 
 2Despite its role as a stratagem to further the political ambitions of Wilson and Davis, Proposition 21 
rendered little help to either politician. As noted earlier, Wilson=s quest for the White House stalled. Indeed, it is 
argued that his anti-immigrant ballot measures so alienated Latino voters that the California Republican Party lost 
tremendous voter support. Some have observed that national Republican leaders such as George W. Bush tried to 
distance themselves from Wilson=s perceived anti minority image, and instead were working to win back Latino voters 
to the GOP. Governor Gray Davis= political fortunes were not helped by Proposition 21. In 2003, California voters 
decided to make him the first California Governor in state history to be recalled from his office. The close association 
of Davis and CCPOA was used by his opponents, especially the current Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, as 
evidence of how Davis was beholden to the powerful interest groups such as the prison guards union. 
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about the specifics of Proposition 21, the less support that it received. Other statewide leaders 
either offered mild support for the Proposition, or remained mute. The principal opponents of the 
measure included juvenile court judges, youth advocates, civil rights groups, many labor unions, 
the state PTA, and the League of Women Voters. However, the groups that opposed Proposition 
21 were unable to raise any significant funds to counteract the statewide campaign that was 
launched by the proponents and bankrolled by the corporate friends of Governors Pete Wilson and 
Gray Davis. 
 Proposition 21 was passed by a large majority of California voters. Within months of its 
passage, a fascinating case in San Diego County derailed the implementation of the ballot measure. 
As a lark, a group of eight middle-class white students decided to chase down and beat some 
Latino migrant workers. The San Diego District Attorney decided to charge each of these 
youngsters as adults under the new law citing: (1) the violent nature of the crime; (2) the fact that 
the offense was committed by a group of teenagers that could be defined as a gang under 
Proposition 21; and (3) the circumstances of the offense that suggested a hate crime. Immediately, 
the financially capable parents of the boys filed a series of appeals attempting to void Proposition 
21. Signifying the racially tinged nature of opinion on Proposition 21, Tim McClain, the editor of 
the business magazine Metropolitan, reflected on the views of his readers: AThese kids, these 
teenagers, as heinous as the crime that they=re being accused of, are not your prototypical person 
that you would see prosecuted under this... They=re not from low-income families. They=re not 
gangbangers. You know they=re not minorities. They=re white, upper middle-class kids going to 
one of the best schools in San Diego@ (Edwards, National Public Radio, 2000). Ultimately, the 
California Supreme Court found that the sentencing provisions of Proposition 21 were 
constitutional. Although no definitive data are yet available, it appears that Proposition 21 slowly 
is being implemented across the state. 
 
19
 The Fight Over the Alameda ASuper Jail@ for Youth 
  Expanding local capacity to incarcerate more young people was another aspect of the 
California War Against the Young. Beginning in the late 1990s, the state Legislature voted to 
reallocate federal funding that was meant to support the construction of new prisons to renovate 
and expand local juvenile correctional facilities. Legislative staffers thought that this move would 
force the Department of Corrections to give greater consideration to alternatives to prison for 
adults. Further, there was a general consensus that local juvenile detention facilities were in a state 
of disrepair; many of the buildings were over 50-years-old and were plainly inadequate for their 
current mission. The Chief Probation Officers Association had tried to get a bond measure before 
the voters to help remedy these conditions. However, California voters had consistently rejected 
bonds for the improving or expanding juvenile correctional facilities, or even for building new 
adult jails and state prisons. To meet the financial needs to expand the adult incarceration capacity, 
state and local officials did an end-run around the voters, relying instead on private financing to 
support prison and jail expansion. This method of public financing entailed higher interest rates to 
be paid to private investorsCadding as much as an additional one-third to costs of prison and jail 
construction. Under President Bill Clinton, the federal government began making grants to the 
states to partially defray the building of new lockups. The California share of these funds exceeded 
$275 million per year. In the early years of this federal program, almost all of the grants went to 
adult facilities. Although most of the monies could be used for renovations and improvements, the 
federal program mandated that there be some, if only token, expansion in the number of custody 
beds. 
 The legislature assigned to the Board of Corrections (BOC) the job of working with 
counties who wished to improve existing juvenile facilities or to build new ones. The BOC created 
a protocol for counties to submit plans for improving and expanding their juvenile detention 
facilities. Counties received small planning grants and could apply to the BOC for a share of the 
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federal monies. This led to a virtual boom in detention bed construction across the state. Grants 
were given to 40 of the 58 counties, and collectively these projects expanded the detention bed 
capacity by 3,150 new beds, or a 50 percent expansion in juvenile beds. Besides the expanded 
capacity, the BOC grants partially paid for replacing another 1,300 detention beds. This all 
happened during the late 1990s while juvenile arrests continued to decline. Moreover, California 
had traditionally possessed one of the very highest rates of juvenile detention in the nation. Thus, 
the Golden State, which used secure juvenile lockups more than any other large state, was creating 
the ability to greatly increase its ability to incarcerate more young people. 
 The case of Alameda County and its proposed expansion of detention provides a 
fascinating case study of how an irrational public policy can be promoted. The County operated an 
aging 299-bed detention center that was located in the northern part of Alameda CountyCclose to 
the neighborhoods in which most detained youths lived. The facility was in urgent need of repair, 
and probably replacement. There were few youth advocacy groups in the community that opposed 
spending funds to improve the conditions of confinement in the old juvenile hall. The County hired 
a Georgia-based planning firm that specialized in helping build new adult prisons to conduct a 
study of the needed renovations. Amazingly, the Georgia group proposed that the County build a 
new 540-bed juvenile hall to be located near the existing jail in the City of Dublin, far from the 
neighborhoods in which most detained youths lived. There were few accessible methods of public 
transportation that would permit the families of these incarcerated young people to visit their 
children. It was asserted that the existing detention center could not be retrofitted, because it sat on 
top of a major earthquake fault line. 
 The data provided to support the vast expansion of the juvenile hall were suspect, at best. 
The Georgia-based planners apparently misinterpreted Alameda County juvenile justice data, 
showing supposed increases in juvenile arrests and detention bookings, even though the Probation 
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 Department=s own statistics showed a significant decline in these juvenile crime trends. The plan 
justifying more detention beds assumed a 50 percent growth in the county=s youth population. 
However, these data relied on projections of population growth in the suburban and rural parts of 
the County. In fact, the growing numbers of new county residents who were moving into high-
priced Agated residential communities@ were unlikely to be candidates for the new expanded 
juvenile detention center. Rising real estate values were leading to more Agentrification@ of 
traditional urban communities, driving the poorest families to seek housing in other Bay Area 
counties. The plan also used data on the highest recorded monthly detention hall populations, 
exaggerating the real level of crowding. Finally, the Georgia group assumed that the Alameda 
juvenile justice system was functioning in an optimal manner, making maximum use of 
alternatives to secure confinement. None of these assumptions were true, but these premises 
allowed the plan to conclude that Alameda County must increase its detention bed capacity by 81 
percent. 
 The County assembled a facility-planning group and applied to the BOC for funding. They 
secured grants of almost $30 million to pay for needed renovations, and approximately another $3 
million to subsidize bed expansion. It should be noted that these BOC funds would cover only a 
small proportion of the costs of the new 540-bed juvenile hall. Further, it was unclear how the 
financially-strapped County would find the funding to add all of the additional staffing that would 
be required to operate the new facility. 
 At this point, the players who were mostly county bureaucrats and some elected officials 
were operating with little public scrutiny of their ambitious game plan. Enter a small band of 
dedicated youth organizers calling itself Books Not Bars (BNB). This group questioned the need 
for the expanded detention capacity that would result in many more young people, especially 
minority youths, being locked up. In addition, Books Not Bars questioned the perverse 
investments in more juvenile jail beds just as local budgets for youth programs, public school 
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funding, welfare supports, and health care were being slashed. The proposed Dublin detention 
complex became known as Athe super jail for kids.@ Books Not Bars held a number of public 
forums and rallies that raised serious questions about the value of the County=s plans. Theses 
idealistic and politically-involved young people worked closely with a number of local and 
nationally respected juvenile justice research and policy groups such as the Center for Juvenile and 
Criminal Justice, the Commonweal Institute, the Youth Law Center, the National Juvenile Law 
Center, the Justice Policy Institute, and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency to support 
the case that the super jail was ill conceived and that more alternatives to detention should be 
created. 
 The mobilizing efforts of BNB received intense media attention as they pled their case 
before the County Board of Supervisors. They traveled to a statewide meeting of the BOC to 
protest the grants to Alameda County. The BOC decided to avoid the adverse publicity and voted 
to ask the County to revise and resubmit its application for funding. This was the first time that the 
BOC actually turned down, if only temporarily, a local proposal to build more detention beds.  
 Next, the game turned ugly as the supporters of the super jail felt the need to discredit all 
those who questioned their plans. In a whispering campaign, BNB was labeled as a subversive 
organization with ties to the radical political entities. More establishment adult critics of the plan 
were accused of withholding their views from county planners, even though the actual planning 
process involved only the input of the Georgia firm and local officials. Juvenile justice officials 
announced to the media that the existing building was unsafe and prone to severe earthquake 
damage. How could the local officials disregard the potential harm to the incarcerated children? 
When confronted with the question of why the Juvenile Court and the Probation Department 
leaders were willing to wait several years for the building of a new facility to Asave these 
endangered children,@ and why there were no emergency steps to move the children to safer 
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 housing, these inquiries were met with silence. 
 Referencing Proposition 21, the backers of the super jail told the community that this new 
law required the building of a much larger detention capacity. Yet only about 12 percent or about 
40 of detained youth were there pending trial as adults. It was claimed that the detained population 
contained a high percentage of very violent youths, however, at least 25 percent of the juvenile 
hall residents were being held while awaiting placement in community group homes. Another 
group of young inmates were locked up for violating court orders or the rules of probation, not for 
new crimes. When pressed to bring in national experts to look at the existing youths in 
confinement and propose viable alternative programs, county officials decided to defer this 
analysis to a more global and more costly study of the entire juvenile justice system. This study 
was scheduled to be completed after the ground was broken for the expanded juvenile hall. The 
Request for Proposals (RFP) for this study explicitly instructed the bidders not to focus on 
criticisms of the juvenile court, nor to revisit the need for a new and expanded juvenile hall. 
 The proponents of the super jail were eventually undone, because residents of the Dublin 
community opposed the situating of the super jail in Atheir backyard.@ These suburban activists 
joined in common cause with BNB to raise many additional questions about the need for such a 
large facility and the logic of placing it many miles from where the detained youths and their 
families resided. The Dublin activists found that the County officials claimed to have performed a 
thorough analysis of alternative locations for the super jail, but no such study could be located. 
The super jail planners had to retreat and restart the process. Next the Sheriff proposed that the 
County take over an abandoned jail located in downtown Oakland that had been closed because 
the Sheriff lacked the funds to operate it. Now the county juvenile justice leaders were fighting 
amongst themselves as BNB was steadily but surely converting more members of the community, 
especially those in faith-based groups, to the view that the super jail was a big mistake. Several of 
the largest religious congregations in Alameda County went on record as opposing the super jail. 
  24
 At their best, the Alameda proponents of the super jail could only marshal a 3-to-2 vote of 
the Board of Supervisors to go forward with the Dublin juvenile facility. The two opposition votes 
came from Supervisors Keith Carson and Nate Miley, who represented the predominantly 
impoverished, minority communities of the County. The strongest support for the super jail came 
from Supervisor Scott Haggerty in whose district the new detention complex would be built, 
thereby creating an important revenue source for the local construction businesses. Supervisor Gail 
Steele also represented many of the more prosperous suburbs. She also was viewed as the 
champion of the probation officers union that stood to benefit financially as more officers were 
hired to run the bigger facility. The last Supervisor, Alice Lai-Bitker, represented a predominately 
white and politically conservative suburban community. She was heavily lobbied by youth 
advocates to oppose the super jail, and actually switched her vote to oppose the project. The 
politically powerful Sheriff announced that he would actively support a challenger to Lai-Bitker in 
the next election. Supervisor Lai-Bitker reversed herself again and rejoined the backers of the 
super jail. Despite this announcement, the Sheriff still vigorously supported an alternative 
candidate to Lai-Bitker in the upcoming election. 
 Although few county employees were willing to be quoted for attribution, it was clear that 
County administrators were demanding loyalty to their agenda. One top county public health 
official was told that he would lose his job if he publicly questioned the need for the super jail. He 
declared that his job with the County did not mean the loss of his right to freely express his views 
about what was best for the public health of young people. 
 The opposition from Dublin residents, combined with the continued crusade by BNB, 
caused the players to retreat. With successive votes of the Board of Supervisors, the size of the 
facility began to shrink, although no new planning data were presented to justify these alterations. 
Next, the county planners reconsidered the safety of rebuilding the new facility on the existing 
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 siteCapparently the problematic earthquake fault was less serious than it had seemed. In the end, 
the Board of Supervisors voted unanimously to rebuild on the existing site and to add the 
minimum number of beds required to qualify for the federal funds. The super jail was dead and the 
tens of millions of taxpayer dollars that were invested in the planning and design of the Dublin 
facility resulted in a compromise that would have been acceptable to the youth advocates at the 
very beginning of the struggle. There were significant personnel changes in the top leadership of 
the Probation Department and the Juvenile Court, and this meant that some of the most forceful 
advocates of the super jail were not longer in the game. 
 
The Remix 
 In the vernacular of contemporary music, a Remix is a blending of components to reach a 
new creative level. One version of the Remix involves sampling from classic popular music of the 
past 50 years that is combined with complex rhythmic additions and the innovative use of the 
spoken word. This form of the Remix seems very applicable to finding the strategies to Abeat 
down@ the players and their game on behalf of young people. Expressed in more formal social 
science jargon, we might think of the Remix as a pathway to social reconstruction. 
 The brief case studies presented in this paper suggest some ways to resist the War Against 
the Young. Some of the best of these approaches use very conventional methods of research and 
the presentation of solid evidence to stand up to the players. Public demonstrations and community 
mobilization proved to be crucial tools against the players and the game. Many of these direct 
community action strategies were very successful during the Civil Rights Movement and the 
mobilization to end the Vietnam War. These successful social justice campaigns taught us the 
value of forging broad community coalitions that bring diverse groups to the table. These 
organizing efforts rest on a profound respect for all people, including the need to listen and 
respond to their immediate concerns. 
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 The Remix used litigation strategies, voter mobilization, and publicity to expose injustices 
and to educate the public. While there was ongoing dialog with the players (Akeep your friends 
close, and your enemies closer@), the progressive groups never lost sight of the lesson that real 
social change needed to happen at the grassroots level.  
 The current generation of social reformers consists of a variety of very dedicated youth 
organizers who are savvy about using the mass media and come armed with research data to back 
up their arguments. Contemporary advocacy groups exhibit an impressive ability to sustain a 
diversity of ethnicity, gender, and age in their organizations. I remember that, after an early 
meeting with representatives of BNB, I confided with a colleague about how polite and respectful 
these young people were with us Aold heads@ from the 1960s. We were a lot angrier, I concluded. 
My very wise colleague educated me that AThey are just a whole lot smarter than we were in the 
1960s,@ and had gotten everything they needed without resorting to confrontational tactics. The 
new generation of social justice advocates shows a very sophisticated grasp of how to balance 
confrontation and accommodation. Most important, the new generation of reformers is focused on 
getting results. 
 In this Remix of old and new, justice reformers can make a real difference in the lives of 
young people. First and foremost, strategies of social reconstruction demand that the players not be 
let off the hook. The cynical leaders in the War Against the Young must be publicly held to 
account for their actions. Second, we should not assume that most citizens know the abuses being 
practiced in their name. Helping the media to expose abusive and corrupt government practices is 
an important part of social reconstruction. Equally important is the ability to put forth real-world 
examples of what a better social policy should resemble. People must be inspired by positive and 
practical solutions to seemingly intractable problems. The players want us to believe that Anothing 
works.@ 
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  Recently in California, the justice reformers have turned the tables on the players by using 
the tool of voter initiatives to usher in progressive policies. For too long these ballot measures 
brought us reactionary social policies such as Three Strikes and Proposition 21. Just a few years 
ago, advocates of progressive reform of state drug policies successfully passed Proposition 36, 
which allowed minor drug offenders to be diverted to treatment programs in lieu of jail. This 
measure was almost universally opposed by criminal justice system officials. Most establishment 
politicians avoided taking a public position on the measure. The proponents employed 
sophisticated polling and focus group techniques to craft their message. They learned that most 
Californians reported that someone in their immediate family was suffering from an addiction 
problem, and that they felt that jailing their family members was an expensive and counter-
productive approach. Proposition 36 passed by a wide margin. 
 Another progressive reform measure, Proposition 66, is designed to amend the pernicious 
Three Strikes Law and is supported by 65 percent of Californians as measured in a recent public 
opinion poll. The Yes on 66 Campaign is utilizing similar and sophisticated electoral strategies to 
those employed for passage of Proposition 36. Progressive reformers have also learned that 
recruiting financial supporters, especially via the Internet, can enable a serious statewide campaign 
to build momentum. Another voter initiative, Proposition 63, places a modest tax on millionaires 
to help fund badly needed programs to prevent and treat mental illness. Neither of these bold 
reforms could have successfully survived the onslaught of special interests if the game had played 
out only in the Legislature and Governor=s Office. 
 The Remix has rediscovered the enormous power of giving young people back their voice. 
Jerome Miller, a champion of the old school justice reformers, built public support for closing the 
terrible youth prisons in Massachusetts in the early 1970s by using this approach. As 
Commissioner of the Department of Youth Services, Miller set up public forums around the Bay 
State that featured youthful inmates who told their stories of maltreatment to civic and religious 
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groups, and to the media. Their message was compelling and persuasive. Current reformers are 
also very attentive to the value of empowering young people. Groups such as The Beat Within 
work with incarcerated young people, encouraging them to write down their experiences, and then 
communicate these powerful insights to the public. Books Not Bars has organized families of 
incarcerated young people to share their hopes and dreams that their children=s lives can be 
redeemed. Organizations such as Youth Radio teach disadvantaged youths to use the tools of the 
electronic media to tell their stories. 
 The players in the War Against the Young can be very ruthless and the game can be very 
Acold,@ but the Remix for social justice is showing us that the rules of the game can be changed and 
the players can be defeated. We have learned that the cynical exploitation of our frustrations, 
anxieties, and psychic distance from the young is too harmful to our communities for any of us to 
sit on the sidelines. 
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